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Whose Ox Is Gored? Free Speech, the War on Terror, and the
Indivisibility of Rights

Donald A. Downs, University of Wisconsin, Madison

Rights have two lives. There are the rights that exist on paper, and those that exist
in actuality, or in practice. In a similar vein, it is one thing to have a right declared by a
court, and another to have this right respected by those who have power over others. One
branch of political science is replete with literature on the gap between what
constitutional courts hold, and what authorities and citizens actually do.1 A number of
reasons help to explain such gaps. For example, classic civil liberty attitudinal research
teaches us that there is generally more support for rights in the abstract than in individual
cases.2 Everyone loves free speech, but not always the free speech of those who fall too
far outside of the mainstream. In Nat Hentoff’s words, it is a matter of “free speech for
me, but not for thee.”3 And as Alexis de Tocqueville portrayed so hauntingly in
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Democracy in America, American’s love liberty at the same time that they are prone to
the the “tyranny of the majority.”4
Tocqueville delineated several “remedies” to the soft despotism posed by tyranny
of the majority, one of the most important of which is the nurturing of such “free
institutions” as local government, private associations, rule of law, and a free press.5
Institutions of higher learning perform a similar political and normative function.
Universities have a fiduciary obligation to promote respect for dissenting thought and
freedom of inquiry, and to instill the intellectual skills that foster critical, independent
thinking.6 Furthermore, universities’ “moral charter is first and foremost to advance
human knowledge,” an obligation that depends on freedom of inquiry as a necessary
condition.7 Yet history has shown that universities and other institutions of higher
education have not always lived up to this responsibility.
In this essay, I want to address how institutions of higher learning have dealt with
free speech in the aftermath of September 11. Some intriguing reactions have taken place
on at least two fronts, telling us something about the politics and practice of rights.

Pre-existing Censorship: The Rise of Progressive Censorship
The question of the post-September 11 status of intellectual freedom is
interesting because a different kind of threat to free speech, academic freedom, and civil
liberty had already gained a foothold in higher education during the later 1980s and the
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1990s. This challenge came about when censorship became of tool for promoting
progressive and egalitarian goals on campus. (What, in the spirit of the philosopher
Herbert Marcuse, is now known as “progressive censorship,” or censorship designed to
promote social justice.)8 The most important reforms included speech codes, very broad
anti-harassment codes, orientation programs dedicated to promoting an ideology of
sensitivity, and new procedures and pressures in the adjudication of student and faculty
misconduct. Though these measures were laudably intended to foster civility, tolerance,
and respect for racial and cultural diversity, they too often had illiberal consequences.
Rather than improving the campus climate, the new policies often provided tools for
moral bullies to enforce an ideological orthodoxy that undermines the intellectual
freedom and intellectual diversity that are the hallmarks of great universities. Several
books have chronicled the extent of this problem, most notably The Shadow University:
The Betrayal of Liberty on America’s Campuses, by Alan Charles Kors and Harvey A.
Silverglate.9 I also have a forthcoming book, Restoring Civil Liberty on Campus, which
deals with these issues from the perspective of political mobilization and resistance.10
Several infringements of basic rights took place on my own campus during the
1990s, events that led me to join in organizing the Committee for Academic Freedom and
Rights, an independent, non-partisan academic freedom and civil liberty group at the
University of Wisconsin. What happened at Wisconsin was typical of many other
schools. For example, an anonymous e-mail sent by a senior-level judicial administrator
at a “top ten institution” in July 2001 to Thor Halvorssen, chief executive director of the
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Foundation for Individual Rights—a leading academic freedom organization in America
today that was established to promote the principles espoused in The Shadow
University—suggests the considerable extent of the problem in the realm of due process
and adjudication:
Mr. Halvorssen,
I spoke with you last week for a while before I got cut off (I was on a pay
phone). I am a senior level administrator and director of judicial affairs
at a top 10 institution, and have information that I would like to share
with you. Believe me, FIRE has barely scratched the surface regarding
university/college judicial affairs, and while reading the testimonials on
your website is interesting, I notice that none are from professionals in
the field. I believe that information from someone in the field would add
greater legitimacy to your good work. Obviously, I don't want to lose my
job, but after many years in the field, I believe the public needs to know
what really goes on, from a perspective you rarely, if ever, hear from. Can
you suggest a next step?11

One indicative example of universities’ commitment to progressive censorship
and related policies is their reaction in the 1990s to actual court decisions that attempted
to circumscribe speech codes. Federal courts struck down the student speech codes at
Michigan and Wisconsin, and a state court invalidated Stanford’s code.12 And in 1992,
the United States Supreme Court issued a decision that many thought would sound the
death knell of speech codes, R.A.V. v. St. Paul, which declared St. Paul’s hate speech
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ordinance unconstitutional for being viewpoint based.13 Most new college codes
resembled the ordinance in R.A.V.
Perhaps surprisingly, R.A.V. had little impact on universities’ treatments of speech
codes. As Jon B. Gould shows in an innovative and thorough empirical study, the number
of speech codes actually increased after R.A.V. Gould attributes this reaction to several
factors, including ideological commitment and institutional political pressures.14 In fact,
Gould probably understates the extent of the resistance to anti-censorship court rulings,
as he does not deal with institutions’ increasing use of harassment codes to limit or
investigate free speech. Originally, such measures were not intended to be used as
expansive speech codes, but rather to prohibit such clearly unacceptable conduct as quid
quo pro sexual harassment, repeated unwanted sexual advances, and environments laden
with sexual expression and prurient appeal. Over time, however, many administrative
authorities began to apply harassment codes much more broadly, making such codes the
most important source of censorship on campus.15 In one recent case, an ill-fated
“civility” policy at Edinboro University in Erie, Pennsylvania, maintained that criticizing
someone’s political views could constitute prohibited harassment. Similarly, the
University of Massachusetts’ code prohibited, among a long list of offenses, demeaning
someone’s “political belief or affiliation.”16 By the end of the 1990s, the spirit of
progressive censorship was alive and well, regardless of what the law said.
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The Return of Classic Censorship: An Occasion for Free Speech Universalism?
With the advent of September 11, a more familiar, traditional challenge to
academic freedom returned. After all, the era of speech codes and progressive censorship
represented something relatively new under the sun. With a few exceptions, censorship in
America has historically emanated from the Right.17 Virtually all of the major historical
conflicts over academic freedom in higher education before the 1960s concerned attacks
from the Right. The major periods in which attacks on academic freedom were unleashed
include the suppression of religious dissidents before the later 19th century; charges
against progressive professors during the Gilded Age; crackdowns against leftists and
anti-war activists during and after World War I; and the multitudinous suppressions of
the McCarthy era.18 Two factors stood out in these previous disputes that distinguish
them from the recent era of progressive censorship: 1) the attacks came from the Right;
and, 2) they came largely from outside institutions of higher education. The threats posed
by speech codes reversed this state of affairs; they stemmed largely from the Left, and, as
often as not, from inside the university itself, where the Left is disproportionately
represented, according to studies.19
As I will discuss in a moment, post-September 11 free speech cases involve both
traditional and progressive forms of censorship. One interesting question, however, is
whether the return of traditional censorship pressure is fostering a greater appreciation of
academic freedom and free speech on America’s campuses. Though we lack adequate
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empirical evidence to answer this question, there is pretty clear anecdotal evidence that
institutions of higher learning have done a fairly good job of protecting freedom of
inquiry and speech in the face of attacks from governmental and social forces against
anti-war and anti-American discourse. For example, in mid-February 2004, Drake
University successfully resisted an order by the Department of Justice to produce
extensive evidence of background checks of members of the university. The government
backed off in the face of institutional and press criticism.20 There is also anecdotal
evidence that progressive censorship is starting to retreat in the face of mobilizations by a
new generation of free speech and civil liberty activists who have brought internal and
external pressure upon administrations. A crucial question is whether these two domains
of activism on behalf of free speech are distinct, or whether they are somehow linked in
concept or practice. The threat to freedom posed by the war on terrorism could be an
occasion for reviving a belief in free speech universalism, as the oxen of both sides of the
political spectrum are now being gored.
A recent example of this type of agreement is the fate of the independent counsel
law at the end of the 1990s. Democrats supported the law in the 1980s because it was
applied mainly against Republicans, while Republicans opposed the law as the
criminalization of political differences. It was only after the Democratic administration’s
ox was gored by the law (now inflicted by Republican adversaries) in the later 1990s that
both sides agreed to a kind of truce and agreed to let the law die a merciful death.21
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Practical conceptions of rights and civil liberty are often forged out of the
cauldron of politics and adversity. In The American Language of Rights, Richard Primus
links the discourse and law of rights in American history to political rhetoric and practice.
The discourse of rights is, among other things, a discursive device employed to help
political actors frame and justify underlying political and normative objectives. The
articulation of rights is often a product of confronting resistance or adversity. Primus
writes, “the major pattern of development in American rights discourse has been one of
concrete negation: innovations in conceptions of rights have chiefly occurred in
opposition to new adversities, as people articulate new rights that would, if accepted,
negate the crisis at hand.”22
An essential attribute of free speech and academic freedom is universalism: these
principles mean nothing if they do not apply to what Justice Holmes called “freedom for
the thought we hate.”23 Have the events since September 11 compelled higher education
to reaffirm the fundamental freedom of speech and inquiry?
There are two routes that can take one toward the universality of rights and equal
protection. First, one can grasp this end deductively as a matter of a priori normative
principle. Second, one can arrive at this destination inductively through experience that
opens one’s eyes to the larger principle at stake, or, less augustly, that makes one aware
of how one’s self-interest is linked to the rights of others. Civil liberties attorney James
Weinstein claims that there is no substitute for experience when it comes to fully
fathoming the First Amendment implications of policies and actions. Courts have
fashioned the modern doctrine of speech (as epitomized by the reigning content and

22
23

Richard A. Primus, The American Language of Rights (Cambridge University Press, 1999), p. 7.
United States v. Schwimmer, 279 U.S. 644 (1929), Justice Holmes, dissenting.

9
viewpoint neutrality doctrines) in reaction to historical conflicts and claims. “Free speech
doctrine is more a product of experience than theory,” Weinstein maintains.24 A personal
example is John Dewey and his allies, who did not fully appreciate the importance of free
speech to democratic self-governance until they were exposed to the widespread
unprincipled suppression of dissent during World War I.25
The experience of having to defend one’s rights against pressure can prompt one
to consider the broader implications and applications of rights claims. Tocqueville
envisioned a somewhat similar process in Democracy in America in his discussion of
“self-interest rightly understood.” This attitude entails a balance between self-interest and
empathy for the rights of others based on a reflection of the links between one’s selfinterest and the plights of others.26 American constitutionalism is, in part, premised on
this principle of mutually reinforcing self-interest. For example, checks and balances and
other restraints on power are designed to further the protection of minority rights, and to
weaken the power of moral or political consensus, which is inherently predisposed to
repress the rights of those who dissent from whatever orthodoxy happens to reign.27 In
his recent book on Socratic citizenship, Dana Villa illuminates the ways in which all
moral orthodoxies harbor the potential to suppress disagreement if they are not checked
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by others or by self-doubt, regardless of how virtuous their causes happen to be.28 Villa’s
work links restraints on moral orthodoxy to the attainment of such ends as the pursuit of
truth and enhancing the quality of citizenship.

The Post-September 11 Era: Has the Pendulum Swung?
Legal scholar Kermit Hall has recently proclaimed that the era of political
correctness is “pretty much dead.”29 This claim is no doubt overstated, as several
conflicts dealing with progressive censorship are still being waged. I can cite only a
couple of examples for reasons of space. The best source of information about recent
cases of both progressive and traditional forms of censorship on campus is the website of
the Foundation for Individual Rights in Education (FIRE).30
One indicative example is the case of a student at Cal Polytechnic Institute, who
was charged in 2003 with “disruption” for simply placing a poster advertising a
conservative black speaker on a bulletin board next to the multicultural center. The talk
was based on the speaker’s book, which criticized welfare policy for perpetrating a
“plantation” mentality in both whites and blacks. Students opposed to the speech
complained to the administration that the posting constituted harassment, and the
administration then subjected the student to a Kafkaesque hearing despite the protests of

28

Dana Villa, Socratic Citizenship (Princeton University Press, 2001), pp. 23, xii. One of Reinhold
Niebuhr’s great insights concerned how the moral impulse is simultaneously the source of humanity’s
nobility and savagery. See, e.g., The Children of Light and the Children of Darkness: A Vindication of
Democracy and a Critique of Its Traditional Defense (Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1944).
29
Hall quoted in Gary Young, “Free Speech Dilemmas: Free Speech ‘Zones’ and ‘Codes’ Go from Campus
to Court,” National Law Journal, January 12, 2004, p.1.
30
www.thefire.org

11
FIRE, the American Civil Liberties Union, and the Center for Individual Rights.31
Another example of continued progressive censorship is the denial of official campus
recognition to several conservative Christian groups on the grounds that their beliefs and
membership policies are discriminatory. A recent FIRE hornbook on the freedom of
religion on campus exposes a number of such cases, as does David Bernstein in a new
book on the status of free speech and associational rights on campus and elsewhere.32 In a
recent case in point, in December 2003, the president of Gonzaga Law School banned a
Christian pro-life group because it restricted its membership to those who shared its
beliefs—a sine qua non of the right of association.33
In addition, some of the cases that arise under the umbrella of post-September 11
censorship also fit the pre-existing model of progressive censorship. Consider the case of
a professor at Orange Coast College a few weeks after September 11. Several Muslim
students accused the professor of calling them “terrorists” and “Nazis,” and of comparing
them to the individuals who drove the planes into the World Trade Center. A thorough
investigation concluded that no basis on which to sustain the charges existed, and that the
accusers had misstated the facts. Nonetheless, the administration placed the professor on
administrative leave, and sanctioned him with a reprimand.34
Another case representing the continuing presence of progressive censorship took
place at San Diego State. A few days after the September 11 attacks, Zewdalem Kebede,
an Ethiopian student at Sand Diego State University who understood Arabic, overheard
31
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some Saudi Arabian students laughing about what happened in New York and
Washington. Upset, he challenged them and asked them why did not “feel shame.” A
heated exchange ensued, and campus police had to order the students to disperse. In what
appears to a parody of the spirit of progressive censorship, the campus Center for Student
Rights wrote Kebede a letter accusing him of engaging in “verbally abusive behavior to
other students.” Eventually, the case was dropped, but only after Kebede’s actions were
reviled in public and a warning letter was placed in his file.35
Despite continuing skirmishes on the progressive censorship turf, there are signs
that free speech is making a kind of comeback in this domain on campus. Two reasons
appear most responsible for this. First, threats posed by the war on terror are forcing
universities to deal with the return of censorship pressure from the outside Right. Second,
some commentators believe that progressive censorship has been thrown on the defensive
over the course of the last year from another source. In a recent column in U.S. News and
World Report, the arch critic of progressive censorship, John Leo, wrote that “campus
censors” are “in retreat.”36 He cites some of the cases mentioned above, but points out
how campus administrators are now recoiling in the face of the legal and political
pressures being exerted by such advocacy groups as FIRE, the Center for Individual
Rights, the Alliance Defense Fund, and the American Civil Liberties Union.
Leo’s emphasis points to the second reason for a possible pendulum turn: the
intensification of political and legal mobilization by civil liberty and free speech activists
who have forced some institutions of higher learning to defend their policies in the light
of public scrutiny—a domain where double standards are harder to defend than behind
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the closed walls of academe. As already mentioned, institutions of higher learning largely
ignored the signals that the U.S. Supreme Court sent in R.A.V. v. St. Paul in 1992.37 A
major reason for this state of affairs was the lack of organized mobilization on campuses
to compel these institutions to respond in a proactive way to this decision. The political
science literature dealing with the effects of major court decisions on attitudes and
behavior stresses that meaningful legal change often requires sufficient political
mobilization to compel change in actual social practice.38 As Timothy Shiell stresses in
his thorough book on speech codes, the absence of organized opposition was partly
responsible for the rise of speech codes in the first place at the schools that pioneered the
speech code movement, such as Yale, Michigan, Stanford, and Wisconsin.39
Two types of mobilization have been most effective. First, FIRE, CIR, the ACLU,
and other groups have created pressure at the national level by deploying publicity,
political pressure, and legal challenges brought by attorneys associated with these groups.
FIRE, in particular, has waged powerful attacks in a large number of cases.40 As Leo
points out, this pressure is having some impact. For example, the guidelines
accompanying the new “civility” code at Edinboro University declared that simply
offending someone for almost any reason constituted “harassment.” A faculty member
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trained in First Amendment principles informed his department chair that the code was
seriously overbroad, and the sympathetic chair then conveyed the colleague’s points to
the university’s office dealing with harassment and discrimination. With the help of these
insights, the officer recognized the problem, and changed the policy to make it consistent
with free speech. In thanking the individuals who enlightened her, the officer also said
that she was grateful because “we would have been sued, especially after what FIRE has
done over at Shippensburg.”41 (In September 2003, a federal court ordered Shippensburg
university to stop enforcing its speech code, which was drastically overbroad. The case
was among the first in FIRE’s “Declaration of War on Speech Codes.”42) The victories
for free speech being won by these groups support the conclusions of law and society
scholars who have maintained that the sustenance of an infrastructure of legal
mobilization is an important ingredient in the actualization of rights.43
The second domain of action is less well known, but also effective: local campus
mobilization. This type of mobilization took place at the University of Pennsylvania in
the 1990s, sparked by the notorious case in which a student was subjected to Kafkaesque
formal proceedings for calling some African American students “water buffaloes,” a term
that had no racial meaning. Alan Kors leveraged this case to create a resistance
movement that led to the president’s abolition of the code and far reaching libertarian
reform of Penn.44
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Another example is the University of Wisconsin, at one time a pioneer in the prospeech code movement. There, a privately funded, nonpartisan group called the
Committee for Academic Freedom and Rights has spearheaded a free speech and civil
liberty movement that has won several important battles. In fact, CAFR served as the
model for FIRE after FIRE’s co-founder, Harvey Silverglate, witnessed CAFR’s key role
in the process that led to Wisconsin’s abolition of its faculty speech code in March 1999.
CAFR has provided legal assistance to several faculty, staff, and students who have come
under questionable investigations and sanctions. In addition, it has led the way on many
political fronts, including: leading the drive to abolish the faculty speech code in the
classroom in 1999 (Wisconsin remains the only case of a code being abolished at the
hands of a political movement on campus); organizing the opposition that led to the
dismantling of a comprehensive system of anonymous complaint boxes in 2000, a system
that had unavoidably Orwellian implications; initiating due process reform in the
university rules governing the disciplining of faculty; providing support for groups whose
free speech has come under attack, often the student newspapers; and pressuring
departments into modifying their own internal speech codes based on the concept of
“professional conduct standards.”45
The Wisconsin initiative had to be accomplished politically because the
Wisconsin branch of the ACLU would not take the code to court. While this decision
upset opponents of the faculty code at first, it proved to be a blessing in disguise because
it necessitated building a political mobilization and organization that has proved to be an
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invaluable resource in recent years. Most commentators believe that a corner has been
turned at Wisconsin in terms of free speech and civil liberty, as the norms of free speech
now enjoy widespread public presence on the campus (backed by mobilization power.)46

Universities and the War on Terror
In discussing the reaction to the war on terror, I rely on an extensive study of the
American Association of University Professors, entitled A “Academic Freedom and
National Security in a Time of Crisis,” and reports in the press and FIRE’s web page.”47 I
do not have the space to discuss the full range of reportes cases or the broader aspects of
the new powers that the government has amassed in the war on terror, particularly those
pertaining to the USA PATRIOT Act. But I should stress that the new laws involve
significantly expanding surveillance and searches of libraries and other campus
programs; extensive record keeping and background checks on students and university
workers in sensitive areas; and gag orders against disclosing government inquiries and
surveillance to third parties, including the targets. Whatever one’s position on the balance
between liberty and security in the post-September world, there is reason to be guarded
and vigilant about the potential abuse of government power.48
Though the AAUP report provides grounds for guarded optimism, it does cite
several examples of chilling effect on academic freedom related to the war on terror.
According to the report, several universities have expanded background criminal checks
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on new faculty.49 (As mentioned above, however, Drake University successfully resisted
the government in this domain in February 2004.) In addition, some schools have issued
broad warnings to faculty about talking about the war in Iraq unless “directly relevant” to
the class. Though it is not improper to require faculty to stick to relevant material in class,
at least one such warning (at Irvine Valley College in California) amounted to a prior
restraint on such expression across the board.50 In another notorious case, a writing
instructor at Forsyth Technical Community College lost her job for criticizing the war in
Iraq in March 2003, even though the war was the subject of the writing assignment that
day.51
Conflicts over curricula and speakers have also been reported on a number of
campuses. In the summer of 2002, a University of North Carolina professor in charge of
the summer reading program for incoming students required them to read Michael A.
Sells’ Approaching the Qur’an: The Early Revelations. A private group brought a lawsuit
against the program, which a federal court dismissed; and the state legislature later
dropped an “equal time” provision after a pitted battle. As the AAUP reported, “Chapel
Hill and University of North Carolina officials stood their ground.”52 Later, the
administration at North Carolina stood firm in the face of protests against “Islamic
Awareness Week.” Similarly, the University of Michigan administration resisted
vehement calls to cancel a conference on the Middle East that included some very
controversial speakers. But the State University of New York at New Paltz succumbed to
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pressure and canceled a panel discussion that outside groups considered “unbalanced in
its criticism of Israel.” A similar result took place at Rutgers University, when the
administration yielded to claims by pro-Israeli groups and state politicians and refused to
host the “Third National Student Conference on the Palestinian Solidarity Movement.”53
Visiting speakers and scholars have also encountered some major problems in the
post-September context. In late 2002, the University of Colorado and Colorado College
stood up to pressure and allowed a pro-Palestinian speaker to come to campus; around the
same time, Harvard University ultimately resisted pressure to disinvite Irish poet Tom
Paulin, who had written that “Brooklyn-born Jews” who resettled on the West Bank
should be “shot dead.” The College of Holy Cross, however, disinvited a prominent
British clergyman when faculty members opposed his visit on the grounds that he was an
anti-Semite.54 Many visiting scholars have also had a hard time getting into the United
States. (This, of course, is not the decision of universities, so it is not directly relevant to
the concerns of this paper.)
An important set of cases involves faculty free expression. Such private groups as
Campus Watch and the American Council for Trustees and Alumni have begun
monitoring classes and denouncing faculty whose views they consider unpatriotic. This is
their right. But such action can contribute to making the climate hostile to free speech, so
it needs to be critically evaluated. And some institutions of higher learning have
jeopardized academic freedom by the way they have responded to public pressure exerted
against faculty members who have made intemperate statements after the September 11
attacks. The AAUP report cites several such cases, which have typically entailed
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statements by faculty blaming America for the attacks, or denouncing America as the real
villain in the world. Despite strong pressure from trustees and the public, I know of no
case, other than the Forsyth case just discussed, in which a faculty member has lost his or
her job for simply expressing an unpopular viewpoint; but some have received
reprimands, which do represent formal sanctions. And one case involving alleged
association with terrorists led to dismissal.
Two clear victories for academic freedom merit mention. In one case, Professor
Nicholas De Genova of Columbia University sparked a firestorm when he called for “a
million Magadishus” during the war in Iraq in 2003, leading alumni and over a hundred
members of the United States House of Representatives to call for his dismissal.
(Magdishu refers to the shooting down of U.S. troops in the movie Black Hawk Down.)
Columbia president Lee Bollinger, who wrote an important book defending free speech
in the mid-1980s, publicly criticized De Genova’s comments, yet defended his right of
free speech, declaring that “under the principle of academic freedom, it would be
inappropriate to take disciplinary action.” Though perhaps chastened, De Genova was not
punished. In another case at City College of New York, Benno Schmidt, vice chair of the
board of trustees, intervened on behalf of several faculty members who made similar
remarks a few weeks after the September 11 events. Schmidt stated that “the freedom to
challenge and to speak one’s mind [is] the matrix, the indispensable condition of any
university worth the name.”55 In the end, the board dropped the matter. During the 1990s,
Schmidt gained a national reputation as probably the nation’s leading administrative
champion of free speech in the face of the challenges posed by speech codes and similar
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policies. His stance in the City College case shows that he is not selective in applying his
principles.56
A case the AAUP calls “grave” involved Sami Al-Arian at the University of
South Florida, who was arrested in February 2003 for providing material support for
terrorism. Though dismissal would certainly be merited if such claims were substantiated
or had a sufficient basis in evidence, the administration decided to dismiss Al-Arian well
before such evidence became known because of the public furor that had arisen
surrounding the case. (The furor was triggered by a campaign conducted by Bill O’Reilly
on The O’Reilly Factor television show.) Both the AAUP and FIRE have opposed the
university’s actions in this case.57
Those who maintain that the faculty in these cases should be immune to criticism
misunderstand the concept of the marketplace of ideas. Taking verbal heat for making
controversial statements is itself an indispensable part of the very “matrix” of free speech.
It is part of the give and take of debate.58 But free speech principles dictate that no one
should be sanctioned for saying controversial things in appropriate forums, and that
institutions with which such speakers are associated should make it clear, as Schmidt and
Bollinger did, that such rights will be protected.

An Occasion to Affirm Universalism
Though the record is less than sterling, the AAUP report on the status of academic
freedom in relation to the war on terrorism concludes that universities today appear to be
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doing a better job of protecting controversial faculty and speakers than they did during
previous eras in which national security fears were prominent, such as the McCarthy era
and the Red Scare following World War I. “Incidents involving outspoken faculty
members have been fewer than one might have expected in the aftermath of so
momentous an event as September 11. Moreover, with few exceptions—at least one of
them grave—the responses by college and university administrators to the events that
have occurred have been reassuringly temperate.”59
Whether institutions of higher education have turned a corner regarding respect
for equal protection and the universality of free speech and civil liberty remains to be
seen. Rigorous empirical work is needed to provide sufficient support for this
proposition. What the present evidence does suggest is that institutions of higher learning
are protecting anti-war free speech and liberty more than in previous eras in which
concerns about national security were high. One reason could be that the liberal values
and interests of university leadership and universities as institutions are challenged by the
war on terrorism, causing these institutions to circle the wagons. In the cases mentioned
above, few involved faculty coming under attack from inside their institutions. The threat
lay outside, not within.
Another possible reason for this posture is more historical: the norms of free
speech have been institutionalized to historically unprecedented extents. Free speech
norms are now widely supported by various forms of organized and mobilized power,
such as universities; library associations; First Amendment law firms; broadcasters and
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publishers; constitutional law doctrine; and free speech interest groups and advocates, to
name just a few. Richard S. Randall has written about the rise of the “free speech society”
in which norms supporting free speech permeate society.60 If so, institutions of higher
education have support in resisting calls for censorship and the punishment of antiAmerican discourse.
Though the war on terror might be reminding educational leaders of the
importance of free speech once again, it is too early to tell if the relatively positive
reaction to pressures emanating from the war on terror have spilled over to the realm of
progressive censorship. In my view, such a state of affairs would be an occasion, in
Alexander Meiklejohn’s words, for dancing in the streets.61 The politicization of speech
policy launched by progressive censorship has not served institutions of higher learning
well. But my breath remains on hold. In the meantime, what the evidence is beginning to
suggest is that the legal and political mobilization of such groups as FIRE, CIR, and
CAFR is starting to make progressive censors think twice. Whatever the state of the
evidence at this point in time, the material for laying a foundation for free speech
universalism on campus is now present. What is needed is the political and moral will to
take the next step in the process.
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